

***United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit***



**TRANSCRIPT OF
RECORD**

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT AND JOINT APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14,134

949

FILED

FEB 6 1958

Joseph W. Stewart

CLERK

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Appellant,

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
United States District Court,
Appellee.

**APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

HENRY LINCOLN JOHNSON, JR.

**626 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.**

Attorney for Appellant

(i)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the conviction of an offense which imports, but does not require moral turpitude or an intent to defraud require disbarment where uncontroverted evidence shows an absence of that moral delinquency warranting the invocation of the extreme sanction of disbarment.

(ii)

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the District Of Columbia Circuit

No. 14,134

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,
Appellant,

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
United States District Court,
Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This cause comes to this Court on appeal from a Judgment of Disbarment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dated June 29th, 1957. Timely notice of Appeal and record herein were filed.

Jurisdiction for this appeal is to be found in the provisions of Title 27, Section 1291 of the United States Code, as revised.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was concerned as one of co-counsel in a partition suit¹ between Mrs. Lena Sims and her nephew which was successfully concluded by sale. Distribution was made to the nephew but Lena Sims refused to accept her one-half share. After the lapse of some months, appellant and the co-trustee placed the undistributed one-half share in the Registry of the lower Court. Prior to this Mrs. Sims engaged appellant and he secured a stay of eviction proceedings so that she could relocate. Although appellant persuaded her to obey the court order to vacate the premises, she returned drafts for her money several times and disappeared.

Appellant, whose inexperience in such matters dictated his association with co-counsel, relied on his immediate associates for guidance when co-counsel left the jurisdiction. When the one-half share had been in the Registry of the Court a little over four (4) years, he was advised by an associate, Mr. Lindsay Caine, that the money could not remain in the Registry longer than five (5) years, and it was his obligation to prevent its transfer to the Federal Treasury, in as much as his client had no knowledge of its deposit and he could not advise her of the consequences. In consonance with this, as her agent and attorney, he did withdraw the share of his client, endorsing his client's name to the check and affixing his signature directly thereunder as attorney. He renewed his efforts to locate his client, to no avail.

No trace of or contact with Mrs. Sims was had in the next five and one-half (5 1/2) years. No request for the money or inquiry was made by his client or any other interested party in her behalf.

¹ His statement given at the instigation of a Mr. Howard, a Government Attorney in the Veterans Administration, was subject to attack, because of the dubious propriety of his acting as counsel for Appellant while owing undoubted allegiance to the government. This type of attack was not available. Mr. Howard, when apprized of his position, had a heart accident and subsequently died. Appellant, suffering from a heart condition, could not dare the rigors of a trial which would not only endanger his life, but that of a friend whose dubious advice had almost dissipated any successful criminal defense of the charge preferred.

One day, without preliminaries, he was requested to come to the Office of the United States Secret Service. He requested another associate, a part time practitioner, then employed by day as an attorney in the Veterans Administration, to go with him. The agent, in an adversary attitude, accused him of forging Lena Sims, name which he denied. He then apprized his associate of the foregoing facts and was advised that he had no authority to sign his client's name, and it was his best interest to admit he had signed without authority and pay the money. He was then arrested, paid the money, and subsequently pleaded guilty to an information on forgery. (J.A. 6-9)

THE PROCEEDING BELOW

The proceeding below came as a consequence of the foregoing, based on the bare allegation of his conviction. No aggravation of the offense was offered by way of pleading or evidence. All of the foregoing circumstances were urged in mitigation, and no fact or circumstance was controverted.¹

THE DECISION

The court below entered judgment of disbarment because Appellant had pleaded guilty. Although application was made, the above decision has not been altered. (J.A. 11).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Title 11, Section 1302, 1951 Edition, D. C. Code.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Finding and Conclusion of the Court Below Erroneously ignores its Inherent Obligation to find Appellant so totally unfit as to Warrant Disbarment. The inquiry may not stop at the finding that a judgment of conviction was entered, upon a plea of guilty, unless moral turpitude is also conceded.

ARGUMENT

In this cause, a proceeding was instituted by way of a complaint charging conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. The defendant admitted the fact of conviction but denied that his conduct, fairly viewed and evaluated was, in fact, an offense involving moral baseness, but was unauthorized conduct, technically measuring up to criterion of conduct forbidden by the forgery statute.^(a) The issue, so joined, evidence tending to reflect upon his bona fides was presented and received, in addition to testimony as to his reputation and in the community, both before and after his conviction. None of this evidence was controverted. While it is doubtless true, the fact of conviction, alone, will import moral turpitude, but base moral character is not an element of the crime itself. Usually the circumstances of a forgery are such that any ventilation would only serve to demonstrate rather than contraindicate moral turpitude. Here, however, the uncontroverted facts limit the inferences to be drawn from the fact of conviction to the minimal elements of the offense. Similarly, convictions for, Burglary,¹ Wilful Evasion of Income Taxes,² have been held not to constitute requisite moral turpitude for the disbarment of an attorney.

^a The act condemned by the forgery statute requires either the act be done with intent to defraud or to the prejudice of someone.

¹ State of Florida vs. Sears, 89 So. 2nd 494 (1956)

² State of Florida v. Evans, 94 So. 2nd 730 (1957)

So in the District of Columbia, for more than thirty years (30) the courts have not inexorably decreed disbarment, upon conviction, for Embezzlement,¹ Assault upon Children, with Guns.² Similarly, lapse of time, between the offense and the proceeding, physical condition of the attorney have been factors which this Court has recognized as the area in which the discretion in trial for disbarment should be exercised.³

Dorsey vs. Kingstand, etc.
84 U. S. Apps. D. C. 264

Your appellant, misguided, but not bent on criminal mischief, affixed his client's name to a check; the evidence shows that this was not dictated by moral depravity, however unjustified. His search for his client before and after this misadventure is not consistent with the picture of an attorney false to his client, and devoid of requisite integrity. His folly was the product of incompetence and misplaced confidence.

Appellant says, in reality the inquiry below was directed at determining if Appellant's conduct warranted a conclusion that he was so lacking in integrity and moral responsibility as to merit the extreme penalty of disbarment. This, the lower Court did not determine.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, Appellant asks that the judgment below be modified or reversed, or this cause remanded for such proceeding as may be meet and proper.

HENRY LINCOLN JOHNSON, JR.

626 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attorney for Appellant

¹ Disbarment, #52 Re. William O. Davis - convicted of Embezzlement, suspended. Misc. #22-57, in Re: Tinney, convicted of Embezzlement, suspended.

² Misc. #29-54 E. E. Daly - Assault with a deadly Weapon, convicted, suspended.

³ Cf. Florida v. Evans, supra.

(i)
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JOINT APPENDIX

1 [Filed February 25, 1957]
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 For The District Of Columbia
 Holding a General Term

In the Matter of the)
 Complaint against)
 Robert McKinley Williams,)
 a Member of the Bar of The)
 United States District Court)
 for the District of Columbia)

Disbarment No. 4-57

**CHARGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS
 AND GRIEVANCES**

The Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia charges as follows:

1. That the respondent, Robert McKinley Williams, is a member of the Bar of this Court, having been admitted to practice on July 1, 1947.
2. That the respondent, on the 30th day of November 1946, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, was convicted upon his plea of guilty of the offense of Forgery, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of One (1) year to Three (3) years, the execution of which sentence has been suspended and the said respondent placed on probation in charge of the Probation Officer of the Court, which judgment has become final.
3. That the crime of which the respondent was found guilty involves moral turpitude.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia prays:

- (1) That these charges be filed with the Clerk of this Court and that the respondent, Robert McKinley Williams, be tried upon said charges, pursuant to the statutes made and provided, and the rules of this Court.

(2) That the Clerk of this Court shall be directed forthwith to issue a summons to respondent commanding him to appear herein on a day certain and answer said charges.

(3) That in the event service of summons aforesaid cannot be made upon respondent in the District of Columbia, that service be made in accordance with Rule 94 (i) of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

2 (4) That respondent, Robert McKinley Williams, be forthwith suspended or disbarred from further practice of the law before the Bar of this Court and also from holding himself out to be an attorney at law in the District of Columbia.

(5) And for such other and further relief as the nature of the case may require and to this Court may seem just and proper in the premises.

**THE COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND
GRIEVANCES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

By: /s/ Edmund L. Jones

/s/ Francis W. Hill

/s/ Roger Robb

MEMBERS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Edmund L. Jones, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says that he has read the foregoing charges signed by him, and by Francis W. Hill, and Roger Robb on behalf of the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and knows the contents thereof; that as a member of said Committee he believes that the matters and things therein set forth are true.

/s/ Edmund L. Jones

[JURAT dated February 4, 1957]

LET THESE CHARGES BE FILED:

/s/ Bolitha J. Laws
Chief JUDGE

3 [Filed March 21, 1957]

**ANSWER OF THE RESPONDENT
ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS**

(1)

No contest is made of the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint. Your respondent has no disposition to dissuade the Court from a consideration of the nature and gravity of the charge as laid, nor is it his want to avert a measured judgment which must attend this proceeding. Leave is prayed to proffer an inclusive picture and perspective of the component facts otherwise unsuggested in the concise and circumspect recitals of the complaint in this cause.

(2)

Further answering, respondent avers that however unfavorably the end product of his conduct may be appraised, at no time, to his present conscious knowledge, was any act or series of acts designed by or in the service of a mind bent on or tainted by criminal mischief. The original cause from which this affair stems, as first contemplated by respondent, only touched matters well within his professional grasp. Unusual developments, factual and procedural, of whose critical significance he was neither apprized by skill or experience, prompted him to seek and secure consultation. While respondent was then unaware of it, his confidante, a choice necessarily restricted by environmental and other poverties, gave him counsel which later developed to be as tragically incompetent as it was readily relied upon.

With this predicate, some years later with the die so cast, the unsympathetic advent of an adversary inquiry destroyed the disarming illusion of the propriety of his conduct, and, bereft of its deceitful support, respondent became bewildered and easy prey for his inquisiter. His last bastion of support, a lawyer of his selection, (a government attorney) whose judgment he sought, met this crisis, by easy, if not inadroit recommendation that respondent capitulate, make a self-accusatory statement and restitution which he supervised and approved. Now completely disillusioned and enmeshed beyond his depth or realization,

respondent had no legal refuge. Later, at the bar of justice on the criminal charge here concerned, respondent found all vestiges of a defense, he may once have employed, either to have been dissolved with his illusions or dissipated in the legal suicide of self-accusation.

(3)

Your respondent is married, sixty (60) years of age, and has spent over thirty (30) years in honorable official employment, and reputable residence in this community. While this may not expiate his transgression, little actual release from the wrack of his predicament is within the gift of this court or his mortal reach. The half-healed scars he wordlessly earned from the chaffing harness of bridled opportunities also will serve as more exquisite centers of remorse, the full measure of which these words cannot capture or convey.

Respondent, respectfully submits himself in the hope the foregoing and other matters to be urged, if permitted, may be so considered that such judgment be passed as will not put beyond future aspiration, that
5 office which he may not continue presently to occupy.

/s/ Robert McKinley Williams

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Attorney for Respondent

* * *

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SS:

I do solemnly swear that I have read and understand the contents of the foregoing reply and verily believe the same to be true.

/s/ Robert McKinley Williams

[JURAT dated March 21, 1957]

Copies of the foregoing acknowledged this 21st day of March, 1957.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND GRIEVANCES

/s/ Ralph A. Curtin
Secretary

6 [Filed June 25, 1957]

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. WILLIAMS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

I, Robert M. Williams, being first duly sworn according to law depose and say that in obedience to the suggestion of my attorney, on June 21, 1957, I went to the home of Lena Sims on California Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and attempted to see if she would recognize my features, in as much as she has said repeatedly that she did not know Robert M. Williams but only had dealings with a M. W. Williams. Your affiant has been informed that Lena Sims has informed the United States Attorneys office and the Treasury Department that she only knew an M. M. Williams and had never had any dealings with Robert M. Williams. I attempted to see her on the morning of June 21, 1957 at or about 10:30 A.M. and again in the evening, when I remained in the vicinity of her home from approximately 7 o'clock, P.M. until midnite. I was informed that she frequently would not answer the door. I returned to her address this morning at 10 o'clock, A.M. and stayed there until 11 o'clock A.M. and was unable to get any response.

About one week ago I went to her home with an affidavit composed from the facts she recited to my sister and wife at a prior time; I did not personally present the affidavit but remained nearby. That Mrs.

7 Sims had no objection to the contents of the affidavit but she refused to sign it because your affiant's name, Robert M. Williams, appeared in the papers instead of M. W. or M. M. Williams. A copy of the proposed affidavit is attached hereto as an exhibit. Your affiant says that he has received an envelope addressed to him in his proper name, Robert M. Williams, in Mrs. Sims handwriting. (See exhibit to other affidavit)

/s/ Robert M. Williams

[JURAT dated June 21, 1957]

AFFIDAVIT

[Filed June 25, 1957]

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SS:

I, Lena Sims, being first duly sworn according to law on oath state, that Attorney Williams, who filed partition suit for my nephew Robert Williams, did on several occasions contact me by mail and in person trying to get me to accept a check as my share of the proceeds from the property that was sold under Court Order, (1010 Kenyon Street, N. W.) but I did not accept the check and told him he could do what he wanted to do with the check for the reason, I thought at the time that the Court did not have the right to sell the property and that my nephew Robert did not want it sold, this was in 1947. I mailed the check back to Attorney Williams twice. I remained in town for some time then I went out of town to work and when I returned I tried to locate M. M. Williams but was unable to do so. The last time I saw Attorney M. M. Williams was when I moved to 715 Fairmont Street, N. W., his last visit with the check in person, but I did not accept it then.

[Filed June 25, 1957]

AFFIDAVIT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SS:

I, Robert M. Williams, being first duly sworn according to law depose and say that I am the respondent in the above cause and that in 1947, I was admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia. At that time I was still employed in the United States Post Office and I associated myself with Caine, Brown & Howard, two members of which were and still are engaged in the practice of law after hours of employment in the government. The first case which I had was one for the partition of real estate from which the present proceeding stems. I was associated in that case with Miss Faniel, who was also admitted to the Bar in 1947.

Nothing unusual occurred up until time for distribution which was not covered as to procedure in the usual treatises and form books access

to, and direction in the use of which was available through Mr. Caine who was a member of the Bar with more than fifteen (15) years practice behind him.

When Mrs. Lena Sims refused to get out of the house after it was sold and refused to take the money which was determined by this Court to be her share the first problem was met. My present counsel represented the purchaser at the trustees sale and when he served on Mrs. Sims an order to show cause why she would not deliver possession to the purchaser I contacted Mrs. Sims and warned her of the consequences of her refusal to vacate. She finally agreed to get out of the house, but, as was reasonable, wanted some additional time to get a place and make
10 the necessary arrangements for moving. I undertook to represent her and secure the additional time, I did this. At this time, because she refused to come to my office and get her check, which had been drawn by Miss Faniel and myself as trustees, I sent the check to her by registered mail. The return receipt card is attached hereto marked Exhibit "A"; she immediately returned the check to me in an envelope which I have attached to this affidavit, marked Exhibit "B". She explained to me that the Court had no right to sell her house and that she would not accept the money.

Meantime she moved to Fairmont Street, N. W. I visited her there and presented the check to her in person, telling her that Miss Faniel had left the City and it was necessary to close her trust account with a receipt for this share which was still undistributed. She then told me that I could do anything with the money I wanted to, that she did not want it. When this development case about I consulted Mr. Caine and he advised me to pay the money in the Registry of the Court and we could then close out our account as trustees. This was done to facilitate Miss Faniel's leaving the City to take a teaching assignment in Virginia.

Nothing was done in the next four years, however, at or about this time Mr. Caine informed me that I should notify Mrs. Sims that if she didn't take the money out of the Registry of the Court within five (5) years,

it would be forfeited to the U. S. Treasury. I immediately sought to find Mrs. Sims; she had moved from Fairmont Street to Gresham Street, when I went to the Gresham Street address I was informed that she had moved, and the information was that she had left the City. I tried to trace her through possible church connections to no avail. To the best of my knowledge she had no other relatives in the City and her nephew
11 was somewhere in New York. When I informed Mr. Caine he told me that it had been my duty to explain the matter fully in the beginning and I had better get the money out of the registry before the forfeiture took place. I immediately took the steps that Mr. Caine advised to get the money out of the registry of the Court. When the check was received I endorsed my clients name and put my name under it as attorney and deposited the check.

I made several attempts to locate some information of Mrs. Sims; the nearest that I got was a Mr. Hypps in Virginia who was a friend of her nephew and he informed me that the nephew had said that his aunt didn't want the money.

The next information I got was an inquiry made over the phone by an attorney who wanted to know whether there was any money left in the title company for Lena Sims. I told him no, that all of the money due her had been received. I have never received from Mrs. Sims or anyone else a request or demand for the money up until the time I was requested to come to the Treasury Department in September, 1956, approximately ten (10) years after the money became available for distribution.

On or about the 10th day of September, 1956 I was requested to come to the Treasury Department to discuss a matter the nature of which was not revealed to me. Being entirely unfamiliar with government agencies I asked Mr. Edward W. Howard, with whom I have been associated to go with me. He was at that time and for a long time had been an Attorney for the Government attached to the Veterans Administration.

When we arrived it was revealed for the first time that it was in

connection with the endorsement of Mrs. Sims name to the check. I was accused of forging her name which I denied. At this time Mr.

12 Howard said he did not think that he could represent me because he was in the Government and asked to be excused. The treasury agent refused to let him be excused but permitted him to consult with me; at this conference I explained to Mr. Howard that Mr. Caine had told me that I had the authority to sign Mrs. Sims name in as much as I had represented her in this matter in one stage. Mr. Howard said that it was in his opinion that I did not have that authority and the best thing for me was to sign the statement and ask for permission to pay the money back to the Treasury. I made and signed the statement and Mr. Howard witnessed it, and at that time Mr. Howard was excused by the Treasury Agent and I was asked to accompany him to Mr. Smithson's office. I was then arrested and admitted to bail.

I returned the money as directed seven (7) days thereafter.

/s/ Robert M. Williams

[JURAT, dated June 21st, 1957]

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A F F I D A V I T

[Filed June 25, 1957]

District of Columbia, ss:

I, Edward W. Howard, being first duly sworn according to law depose and say that I am an attorney at law having been a member of the Bar of this Court for more than 20 years; that the great majority of that time I have been employed in the Veterans Administration as an attorney; that I was so employed in the Veterans Administration on or about the 10th day of September, 1956, when Mr. Williams asked me to accompany him to the Treasury Department because he did not know what they wanted and he was unfamiliar with the practice before government agencies; that when we arrived and after some conversation the agent asked Mr. Williams if he signed the name of Lena Sims to a government check, this Mr. Williams denied; that then the agent said that the name Lena Sims was not the signature of Lena Sims because

they had samples of her writing; that Mr. Williams admitted signing her name but denied that he had forged it; and that at this time I told the agent I would like to be excused because I could not represent Mr. Williams as I was a government attorney employed by the Veterans Administration but he refused and insisted that I remain until he had finished with Mr. Williams; that Mr. Williams made a statement which he signed and I witnessed his signature and was then permitted to leave.

Further this deponent sayeth not.

/s/ Edward W. Howard

[JURAT, dated June 21st, 1957]

14 [Filed June 25, 1957]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Court having held a hearing upon this complaint, having heard respondent's counsel, and considered the affidavits submitted in behalf of the respondent, nevertheless feels that in view of his plea of guilty to the indictment charging forgery he should be disbarred from the further practice of law in the District of Columbia.

The Committee on Admissions and Grievances will submit a proper order to carry this disbarment into effect.

/s/ Edward A. Tamm
JUDGE

/s/ James R. Kirkland
JUDGE

/s/ Joseph C. McGarraghy
JUDGE

Dated: June 24, 1957.

15 [Filed June 25, 1957]

ORDER OF DISBARMENT

This matter having come on for hearing upon the charges filed by the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of this Court, and the Court having heard respondent's counsel and considered the affidavits submitted in his behalf, and having made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is this 25th day of June, 1957,

ORDERED, That the respondent, ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS, be, and he hereby is, disbarred from further practice of law before the bar of this Court; and the Clerk of the Court is directed to strike the name of said ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice before this Court, and it is further

ORDERED, That the respondent, ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS, be, and he hereby is, prohibited henceforth from holding himself out to be an attorney at law in the District of Columbia.

/s/ Edward A. Tamm

/s/ James R. Kirkland

/s/ Joseph C. McGarraghy

U. S. DISTRICT JUDGES

16 [Filed June 29, 1957]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Notice is hereby given this 29th day of June, 1957, that Robert McKinley Williams hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia from the judgment of this Court entered on the 25th day of June, 1957 against said Robert McKinley Williams

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Attorney for Robert McKinley
Williams

307 E Street, N. W.

Clerk of Court please mail copy to petitioner
Comm. on Admissions & Grievances

17 [Filed July 8, 1957]

MOTION FOR STAY OF JUDGMENT

Now comes the respondent, Robert M. Williams, by his attorney, and moves the Court for a stay of execution of the judgment entered in this cause, pending consideration of the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and/or the appeal taken therefrom and, for reason therefor, assigns as follows:

(a)

Execution of such judgment should be stayed pending a determination of respondent's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment herein.

(b)

Respondent has noted and is diligently prosecuting an appeal from said judgment.

(c)

Because of the accident of vacation it will be impractical to obtain an alteration of said judgment until the panel returns.

(d)

Unless some step is taken to permit respondent an opportunity to close out his business relations with his clients in an orderly way, irreparable damage may be visited upon clients who have paid for respondent's services may have their rights and causes unduly jeopardized.

18 (e)

And for other reasons apparent on the face of the record.

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Attorney for Robert M. Williams

19 [Filed July 8, 1957]

MOTION TO MODIFY OR ALTER A
JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT

Now comes the respondent in the above entitled cause, by his attorney, and moves the Court to modify and/or alter its findings and judgment in the case at bar, and for reasons therefor assigns as follows:

1. Since the filing of the memorandum and judgment in this cause, your respondent has discovered other and further evidence, not available to him at the hearing of this cause, which has a direct bearing on the issues, the nature of which evidence and method by which it was uncovered, is contained in the affidavit of respondent attached hereto.

2. No opportunity was afforded respondent, or his counsel to inspect or see the form of the judgment actually entered, nor was there notice given of the submission of the same.

3. Unusual hardship has been visited upon your respondent's clients and his counsel, because of the immediacy of the order and the consequent lack of opportunity to secure other counsel or satisfactory settlements with such clients.

4. Additional hardship has occurred due to the implementation of said order in accordance with pertinent local rules despite the provisions
20 of Rule 62 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. For other reasons apparent on the record and to be urged at a hearing of this motion.

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.

Attorney for Robert McKinley Williams

[Certificate of Mailing]

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The issue to be determined in this cause was principally to determine whether the respondent should be censured, suspended or whether a disbarment order should be entered, and, if such order were to be entered, what kind of order should be entered so as to administer a measured justice. The matter contained in the affidavit and the other evidence adduced, consistently negate the requisite baseness usually found as a prerequisite for the extreme penalty of disbarment. These are matter about which the Court should exercise discretion rather than ignore.

The Court has the power to entertain this motion.

Rules 59(e), 60(a) & 62 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.

Attorney for Robert M. Williams.

22 [Filed June 25, 1957]

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Court, this 25th day of June, 1957, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

1. That ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS was admitted to the Bar of this Court on the 7th day of July, 1947.
2. That said respondent was, on to-wit, the 30th day of November, 1956, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, convicted upon his plea of guilty of the offense of Forgery, and was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of One (1) year to Three (3) years, the execution of which sentence was suspended and the said respondent placed on probation in charge of the Probation Officer of the Court, which judgment has become final.
3. That the crime of which the respondent was convicted involves moral turpitude.

Conclusions of Law

The Court finds that the respondent, ROBERT McKINLEY WILLIAMS, is guilty of professional misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

/s/ Edward A. Tamm

/s/ James R. Kirkland

/s/ Joseph C. McGarraghy

U. S. DISTRICT JUDGES

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14, 134

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
United States District Court,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HENRY LINCOLN JOHNSON, JR.
626 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Attorney for Appellant

*United States Court of Appeals
For the
District of Columbia Circuit*
FILED MAR 28 1958

Joseph W. Stewart
CLERK
Appellant,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The District of Columbia Circuit

No. 14, 134

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
United States District Court,

Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

From a reading of the brief filed each party has a different conception of the procedural facts. Appellant proceeded in the court below upon the premise that the instant disbarment proceedings were initiated by invoking the remedy set out in Title XI, Sections 1302, 1304, of the District of Columbia Code. (See appellant's brief Pg. 3). Appellee, at least on appeal, has pitched its brief on the theory that it had utilized the procedure and provisions of Title 11, Section 1303. This impasse, appellant feels must be resolved.

Appellant suggests that his cause would be seriously prejudiced, it through inadvertence, or his own neglect, he has misconstrued the nature of the cause below and consequently the posture of this case on appeal.

Appellees brief proposes that the proceeding below was brought under the authority of Title X1, Section 1303 of the Code, which provides as follows:

"Whenever any member of the bar shall be convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude, and a duly certified copy of the final judgment of such conviction shall be presented to said court, the name of the member so convicted may thereupon, by order of said court be stricken from the roll of members of said bar. (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant has consistently assumed that the proceeding below was brought under Title X1, Section 1302 of the Code and he directed and adopted his defenses, pleadings, evidence and procedure on the trial level and pitched his brief here in good faith that this cause was so governed. Title 11, Section 1302, provides as follows:

"Said District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in general term, shall have full power and authority to censure, suspend from practice, or expel any member of its bar for any crime, misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional misconduct, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Any fraudulent act or misrepresentation by an applicant in connection with his application or admission shall be sufficient cause for the revocation by said court of such admission."

THE RECORD SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE STATUTORY REMEDY SET FORTH IN SECTION 1302 WAS EMPLOYED.

Appellant says that the procedure outlined in Title X1, Section 1303, was not followed in this case.

¹ Under the Federal Rules grounds of jurisdiction are generally required to be stated in the complaint. Rule 8a, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

² See Page 3 of Appellees brief.

(a) A certified copy of the record of conviction was not plead or attached as an exhibit to the complaint, nor did appellee present to the court such a document at any stage of the proceedings below.

(b) The complaint in this case does set forth the fact of conviction, but does not refer to any specific jurisdictional claim, so as to direct attention to the invocation of any statute.

(c) The procedure followed conforms precisely with the requirements set out in Title XI, Sections 1302, 1304 in the following particulars:³

- (1) It recites the conviction of a felony.
- (2) It was initiated by a complaint and summons and seeks the suspension or disbarment of an attorney.
- (3) A trial was held upon the complaint and answer in conformity with the provisions of Rule 94 (d) and (e) etc. of the Local Rules of the United States⁴ District Court for the District of Columbia.

The lack of conformity with the significant procedural differences contained in Section 1303, and the apparent and consistent compliance with the identifying procedural requirements of a proceeding under Section 1302, (both of Title 11) would seem to preclude a consideration of this appeal from any other view. Furthermore, other substantial rights directly stem from this conclusion. The entire theory of appellant's defense in the cause below was adapted and directed, and the issues framed with that procedure in mind. The only issue formed by the pleadings was joined in this manner and if, as is evident from the view of appellee, no such issue exists, then there is no real meaning to the appellant's efforts below and the substance of this appeal becomes vacant of much of its reality.⁵

³ Title 11, Section 1304, outlines of the procedure for disbarment disciplinary measures and trial under Section 1302.

⁴ Rules 94 (d & e) CHARGES: SUMMONS: SERVICE, ANSWER: DEFAULT: Should the Committee, after investigation, so decide, it shall prepare charges and submit them to the Court. If the court orders the charges to be filed the clerk shall file them and forthwith issue a summons directed to the respondent commanding him to answer CHARGES, TRIAL OF: PUNISHMENT: INJUNCTION: When an answer has been filed the cause shall be set down for hearing at a time fixed by the court. Should the charge be sustained, the court may censure, suspend, disbar, or otherwise discipline the respondent...

⁵ It is the appellants view that any procedure which would deny to appellant the right of being heard on the ultimate issue of his fitness to remain a member of the bar, would deny him due process. Laughlin v. Wheat, 68 App. D.C. 190, 95 Fed. 2nd 101. It would of course be no answer than an opportunity was afforded to present evidence if they receive no judicial consideration.

THE APPEAL FROM APPELLANT'S THEORY

The court below had only one issue about which there was any semblance of contest. Was the appellant here guilty of moral turpitude, and if so, whether his offense, as a whole, was of such gravity as to warrant the invocation of the extreme sanction of disbarment. On this issue, appellant was entitled to a judicial decision as is contemplated by the rules.⁶

All of the evidence in the case below was adduced by way of affidavit. This evidence was uncontroverted and negates the existence of moral depravity or dishonesty. In addition it reflects the absence of an intent to do a wrongful act and shows mitigating circumstances approaching legal exoneration of responsibility for the crime itself.⁷ No contrary evidence was introduced, nor was any of the evidence controverted or impeached in any manner except by and through the bald fact of conviction. As is the practice in this and other jurisdictions where the statute does not make disbarment mandatory upon conviction, inquiry into and consideration of the circumstances can not be compressed within the narrow scope of a record alone. The concept of moral turpitude is not contained within or expressed as a legal standard and it is implicit that the surrounding circumstances must of necessity determine its existence and extent. Ventillation of the details of a forgery generally would not serve to mitigate the gravity of such an offense. Here, however, the contrary is true.

The disbarment of an attorney because of conviction of a felony was reversed by the United States Supreme Court even though it appeared that the attorney had been convicted of a fraud on the government. It

⁶ Findings on the basis of the judgment of conviction alone or of the fact that a plea of guilty was entered ignores rather than states the ultimate fact to be found, and leaves no way to judge the correctness of such finding.

The ultimate fact itself would be insufficient if there had been no memorandum. Cf. Skelly Oil Co. v. Holloway, 171 Fed. 2nd 670; However, this "saving grace", also reveals the absence of the fact found on the issue, i.e. What fact existed in evidence which spelled moral turpitude.

⁷ See State v. Sears, 89 SO. (Fla.) 494, where a conviction for burglary, resulting in disbarment, was reduced to a suspension where the details of the offense revealed doubt as to guilt and mitigating circumstances.

considered the circumstances of the crime to be indispensable to a proper consideration of what punishment the accused should be accorded.

Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278
77 S. Ct. 1274

The definition of the crime, then, cannot be the criterion upon which the exercise of the Court's discretion may be exercised. It is rather the conduct of the attorney which is to be judicially appraised. Punishment for the crime itself ended at the bar of the criminal court. Here, however, the actual conduct of the appellant, his moral worth or want, seemingly is of little moment. His plea of guilty, allegedly was dispositive of the issue.⁸ The uncontradicted and sole evidence in the record may not be reconciled with such a conclusion. Appellant appears to have been disbarred not because his conduct and consequent fact of his moral want but because the conviction compelled such judgment. A misdemeanor at common law, forgery had as a necessary ingredient, an intent to defraud. By statutory enactment this crime has been elevated to a felony, its scope altered to substitute for fraud less noxious criteria for guilt.⁹ It is evident from the judgment below there has not been a companionate lessening of the imputations to be drawn from the stain of the charge. Here, it appears the court below felt so tethered to the consequences of appellant's guilty plea that the factual circumstances of his offense were not accorded that consideration which due process should entail. As a result, a punishment has been imposed without that judicial admeasurement which justice seems to require.

Indeed, in the District of Columbia moral turpitude is not to be artificially limited by a criminal category. The facts and circumstances control.¹⁰

⁸ See Memorandum of the Court below, (J.A. Pg. 10)

⁹ Pina v. United States, 165 Fed. 2nd 890.

¹⁰ In Rudolph v. United States, et al., 55 Appx. D.C. 362; 6 Fed. 2nd 487, at page 488, the Court said:

"There is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes moral turpitude.... The circumstances attendant upon the commission of the offense usually furnish the best guide.... Intent, malice, knowledge of the gravity of the offense and the provocation are all elements to be considered."

Neither of the statutes referred to by the appellee in its brief, by letter or spirit, attempts to constitute one a moral leper who, as appellant here, has come, unwittingly, even if carelessly, within the outer reaches of their grasp. Appellant petitions this court for relief, not from the rigors of appropriate expiation of his transgression, but from the undeserved infamy which disbarment pronounces.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY LINCOLN JOHNSON, JR.

626 Third Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attorney for Appellant.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The District Of Columbia Circuit

United States Court of Appeals
For the
District of Columbia Circuit

FILED JUN 13 1958

Joseph W. Stewart
CLERK

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

No. 14,134

THE COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS
AND GRIEVANCES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT,

Appellee.

**PETITION FOR REHEARING OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT BE
AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTION TO ENTERTAIN APPLICATION
FOR REDUCTION IN PENALTY**

Your petitioner asks that the Court grant a rehearing in this cause or to amend their opinion so as to accord appellant an opportunity to apply for a mitigated punishment at a hearing at which he can fully meet all charges for the following reasons:

(1)

Your appellant feels that he did not properly present the substance of his appeal.

(2)

Your appellant suggests to the Court that the gravamen of his complaint against the decision of the Court below may not have been clearly presented. In substance appellant says:

(A) Granted that his conviction of forgery, on its face and without explanation would be sufficient to warrant disbarment, yet nevertheless, when all of the evidence heard by the trial court shows a lack of moral turpitude, the trial Court could not ignore its duty to find moral turpitude in appellant's conduct apart from the record.

(B) The findings of fact that the disbarment was ordered, because appellant plead guilty, alone was not a proper exercise of the trial Court's discretion but that the nature and gravity of appellant's offense as spelled out by the facts and circumstances must necessarily supply the criterion upon which such discretion is and should be exercised.

(C) Finally, the ventillation in this Court of inflammatory matters not of record in the cause below, after submission of this cause, so prejudices a fair and impartial consideration of this matter from the point of view of the parties and the Court that the final determination to disbar appellant should attend a hearing, where he could meet such charges and defend against them.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
626 Third Street, N. W.
District 7-8000

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the office of Edmund L. Jones, this 13th day of June, 1958, postage prepaid, at the Colorado Building, Washington, D. C.

/s/ Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA *United States Court of Appeals*
CIRCUIT *For the*
District of Columbia Circuit

FILED

MAR 13 1958

No. 14,134

Joseph W. Stewart
27
CLERK

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS, *Appellant,*

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND GRIEVANCES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT, *Appellee.*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

By EDMUND L. JONES
FRANCIS W. HILL
ROGER ROBB

Subcommittee on Grievances

QUESTION PRESENTED

In a trial of an attorney for disbarment, following his conviction upon a plea of guilty to the charge that he, for the purpose of obtaining \$2,756.51, falsely forged an endorsement upon a check, was he not properly disbarred?

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IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14,134

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS, *Appellant*,

v.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND GRIEVANCES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT, *Appellee*.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

COUNTER STATEMENT

Appellant was admitted to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on July 7, 1947. The appellant, by information Criminal No. 1106-56 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, was charged with the violation of 18 U. S. Code 495; spe-

cifically, that on or about December 17, 1951, the said appellant

“for the purpose of obtaining and receiving from the United States and from its officers and agents \$2,756.51, falsely forged the endorsement ‘Lena Sims’ on the back of a paper writing in the form of a check
• • •”

The appellant was represented by able counsel, namely, Henry L. Johnson, and the appellant consented that the proceedings might be by information instead of by indictment.

Appellant, upon his plea of guilty, was found guilty of the offense of forgery as charged in Count One, and was committed for a period of one year to three years. The execution of the sentence was suspended and the appellant was placed upon probation.

The Committee on Admissions and Grievances filed charges in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Disbarment No. 4-57, charging that the appellant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of the offense of forgery and the Committee alleged that the crime of which the appellant was found guilty involved moral turpitude.

Appellant filed an answer to the charges of said Committee and stated “No contest is made of the allegations of Paragraphs One, Two and Three of the Complaint”. These were the only paragraphs of the Complaint which contained charges; Paragraph One alleged that appellant was admitted to the Bar on July 7, 1947; Paragraph Two alleged that appellant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of the offense of forgery; and Paragraph Three alleged that the crime of which appellant was found guilty involved moral turpitude.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Following a conviction upon the charge of forgery for the purpose of obtaining \$2,756.51, proceedings were instituted seeking the disbarment of appellant, and the Lower Court, after a full hearing, did enter an Order disbarring the appellant; the appellant, having been found guilty of such an act, was properly disbarred.

ARGUMENT

As indicated in the Counter Statement, appellant was admitted to the Bar on July 7, 1947; appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of forgery and was convicted upon his plea; it was alleged in the complaint filed against appellant by the Committee on Admissions and Grievances that the crime involved moral turpitude.

Section 22-1401 of the D. C. Code, 1951 Edition, provides:

"Whoever, with intent to defraud or injure another, falsely makes or alters any writing of a public or private nature, which might operate to the prejudice of another, or passes, utters or publishes, or attempts to pass, utter or publish, as true and genuine, any paper so falsely made or altered, knowing the same to be false or forged, with the intent to defraud or prejudice the right of another, shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 10 years."

Appellant was convicted of the charge aforesaid.

Section 11-1303, D. C. Code 1951 Edition, provides:

"Whenever any member of the bar of said court shall be convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude, and a duly certified copy of the final judgment of such conviction shall be presented to said court, the name of the member so convicted may thereupon, by order of said court, be stricken from the roll of the members of said bar, and he shall thereafter cease to be a member thereof * * *".

The factual matters set forth in appellant's brief are matters by way of defense in a criminal case and all of these matters have been resolved against appellant. Appellant cannot now retry a criminal case.

The appellant, after the Order of Disbarment, filed a Motion to Mitigate Punishment, which motion was heard by the lower court and was denied.

The Memorandum Opinion of the lower court is in point and we take the liberty of quoting from it:

"The Court is of the opinion that the integrity of its Bar is the very foundation of the Court's ability to promote the administration of justice. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes has characterized the profession of the law as:

' . . . the privileged administration of a public trust affording the necessary means by which private and public rights are vindicated, private and public wrongs are redressed, and the very basis of civilization is made secure.'

"The Court must of necessity, in its dealings with the attorneys who are the officers of the Court, recognize varying degrees of professional skill and professional experience. The Court does not feel, however, that it can recognize varying degrees of integrity. The Court feels that when one of its officers charged with the 'privileged administration of a public trust' violates that trust, violates his professional and other responsibilities, and commits a felony involving a client's funds, he conclusively and finally destroys the bond of confidence which must exist between a court and himself. The Court does not believe that it could ever repose in the respondent the confidence which the Court must feel in its officers if the Court is to function honorably, efficiently and effectively. If an attorney's honesty has been successfully impugned, the Court feels that he should no longer be permitted to practice before it. Mr. Justice Miller of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in 1939, stated:

'If those not properly trained or those who are morally disqualified are permitted to practice before the courts, the administration of justice will suffer. "It is not enough that the doors of the temple of justice are open; it is essential that the ways of approach be kept clean." *Hatfield v. King*, 134 U. S. 162. Moreover, "Our trouble is not simply in keeping the pestilence out of the temple, but in destroying it inside".' *Booth v. Fletcher*, 101 F. 2d 676.'

"The Court must be stern in demanding the highest standards of character and morality from its attorneys.

'Where an attorney was convicted of theft, and the crime was condoned by burning in the hand, he was nevertheless struck from the roll. "The question is," said Lord Mansfield, "whether, after the conduct of this man, it is proper that he should continue a member of a profession which should stand free from all suspicion". *Ex Parte Wall*, 107 U. S. 265.

" * * * It is only for that moral delinquency which consists in a want of integrity and trustworthiness, and renders him an unsafe person to manage the legal business of others, that the courts can interfere and summon him before them. He is disbarred in such case for the protection both of the court and of the public.

'A conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude implies the absence of qualities which fit one for an office of trust, where the rights and property of others are concerned. See Justice Field's dissent in *Ex Parte Wall*, supra.'

"The Court believes that in the best interests of the Court and the community, it must deny the defendant's motion for mitigation of punishment."

There really is no dispute in this matter and appellant states in his argument that "The defendant admitted the fact of conviction * * *". Appellant tries to argue that the facts in the instant case do not constitute moral turpitude.

We submit that since an element of the crime of forgery, as defined by statute, is an intent to defraud or injure another by a false writing, the offense does involve moral turpitude and the Court below acted properly in disbarring the appellant.

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

By EDMUND L. JONES

FRANCIS W. HILL

ROGER ROBB

Subcommittee on Grievances

FILED JUN 19 1958

Joseph W. Stewart
CLERK

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14,134

ROBERT M. WILLIAMS, *Appellant*

v.

THE COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND GRIEVANCES OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, *Appellee*

ANSWER OF COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS AND GRIEVANCES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT TO PETITION FOR REHEARING OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT BE AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTION TO ENTERTAIN APPLICATION FOR REDUCTION IN PENALTY

Now comes the Committee on Admissions and Grievances and in opposition to petitioner's application for a rehearing respectfully shows to the Court:

Although appellant in his answer admitted the charges, his counsel was heard fully by the lower Court on his contentions that there were extenuating circumstances which would justify a lesser punishment than disbarment. After

hearing appellant's counsel at length, the lower Court entered an order of disbarment.

Thereafter, appellant filed in the lower Court a motion to mitigate punishment and again appellant's counsel was heard at length and, after consideration, the order of disbarment was affirmed by an opinion of the Court which is quoted in part on pages 4 and 5 of the Committee's brief filed in this Court.

The petition here under consideration states, in substance, that appellant feels that he did not properly present the substance of his appeal and suggests to the Court that the gravamen of his complaint against the decision of the Court below may not have been clearly presented. Certainly, there is no merit to these contentions. Appellant's counsel clearly and fully stated appellant's position to this Court. In fact, he was permitted to extend his argument beyond the time allotted by the rules.

Petitioner also complains of the Committee's action in moving to make a part of the record certain documents which were not in the record at the time the case was argued before this Court. This motion was denied because it was moot, as this Court had already affirmed the judgment of the lower Court. The documents attached to the motion were physically returned to the Committee by the clerk and are not part of the record.

There can be no question but that this matter has been carefully considered by the Courts of this District on three separate occasions: First, when it was originally considered by the lower Court; second, when it was again considered by the lower Court in its consideration of the motion to mitigate punishment; and, lastly, when it was carefully and thoroughly considered by this Court. In each instance, the Court found that the order of disbarment was proper.

We submit there is nothing in the present petition which indicates that the order should be changed or modified.

Respectfully submitted,

COMMITTEE ON ADMISSIONS & GRIEVANCES
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

By EDMUND L. JONES

FRANCIS W. HILL, JR.

ROGER ROBB

Subcommittee on Grievances.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer to Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, this 23rd day of June, 1958, to Henry Lincoln Johnson, Jr., Esq., attorney for appellant, 626 Third Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

EDMUND L. JONES, *Member*
Committee on Admissions & Grievances
of the United States District Court